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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF ADMIRALTY.
HoN.

JAMES

G.

JENKINS,

Formerly Judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Judicial Circuit,
Formerly Dean of the Marquette College of Law.
The constitutional grant of power to the courts of the United
States includes "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
By the original Judicial Act of 1789, this power was vested in the
District Courts of the United States, and was made exclusive of
the courts of the several states; but it saved to suitors the right
of the common-law remedy where the common-law as it then
existed, is competent to give it. This means that jurisdiction in
proceedings in rem is exclusive, but is not exclusive as to proceedings in personam. The courts of admiralty may enforce in
ren a lien created by a state statute; so a suitor may proceed in
the admiralty either in personam against the owner of a vessel,
or in rem against the vessel itself; or he may resort to the common-law remedy in a state court, and may attach the vessel as
the property of the owner; because the vessel is held in such case,
not as itself an actor, but merely as property of the owner, and
the title or interest of the defendant in such suit may be divested
by such proceeding. All maritime contracts may be enforced
either in admiralty in rem, or in personam, or in the state courts
in personam only.
Formerly it was a matter of grave dispute whether a maritime
contract included anything except what was done upon the sea.
As early as 1815, in the celebrated case of DeLovio vs. Boit,
2 Gall. 398, the question arose whether an action in personam
could be maintained in the admiralty upon a marine policy of
insurance, the contract having been made on land, and to be
performed on land. That eminent jurist, Judge Story, delivered
an elaborate opinion concerning the jurisdiction of the admiralty.
In a masterly review of the decisions of the common-law courts,
seeking to restrict that jurisdiction, he showed them to be irreconcilable with any just conception of the admiralty jurisdiction.
He challenged the limitation applied by those courts that jurisdiction extended only to causes of action arising "from things
done upon the sea," and asserted the true limitation to be "to
things pertaining to the sea"; that the delegation of jurisdiction
comprehended all marine contracts, whether made or to be ex-
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ecuted on land or sea, which related to the navigation, business
or commerce of the sea. This doctrine encountered censure and
opposition from both bench and bar. Even Mr. Justice Daniels,
of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Jackson vs. Magnolia, 2o HoV. 335, decided in 1857, speaks of Judge Story's
decision as "a broad pretension for the admiralty, under which
the legal profession and this court staggered for thirty years
before being able to maintain it." It was not until I87O, after
fifty-five years of contention, that the precise question was presented to the Supreme Court in Insurance Company vs. Dunham,
ii Wall. i. Then by the unanimous concurrence of the Judges,
the position of Judge Story was fully sustained, as declaring the
correct principle of admiralty jurisdiction; and it was determined
that whether a contract was maritime or not, depends not upon
the place where made, but upon the subject matter.
And yet, singularly as it may appear, there are two exceptions which seem to me to be irreconcilable with the broad doctrine sustained by the Supreme Court. The first is with respect
to the building of a ship. This would seem to come within the
rule that the admiralty has jurisdiction "to things pertaining to
the sea." And yet it has been generally held in this country that
a proceeding in admiralty will not lie, either in rein or in personam, for the cost of building a ship.
So likewise, as I shall have occasion hereafter to state, a vessel is liable for injury done upon the water, but not to an injury
done to a thing upon land; the courts holding that both the cause
and the effect must be consummate upon the water.
It is difficult for me to reconcile these holdings with the broad
and liberal jurisdiction asserted and maintained that admiralty
has jurisdiction of all things pertaining to the sea. Yet these distinctions have been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United
States and must be recognized as established law.
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction embrace two great
classes of cases, one dependent upon locality and the other upon
the nature of the contract or service. The first embraces all claims
for torts committed on the high seas and upon the navigable
waters of the United States. It includes all injuries, whether
committed by direct force, or in consequence of negligence or
malfeasance; including personal injuries to passengers, seamen
or freighters, or suffered by a stranger.
119
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The second includes all contracts, claims and services which
are purely maritime, and which respect rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation. This jurisdiction extends
to all contracts of affreightment, whether by charter party or by
bill of lading, when performed upon the high seas or the
navigable waters. It embraces contracts for the carriage of passengers, including all suits growing out of the relation of passenger and carrier. It embraces marine insurance, salvage, agreements of consortship between wreckers, and to compel distribution by one salvor who has received the whole amount, among
co-salvors. It embraces general average, bottomry and respondentia bonds, claims for repairs, supplies and materials furnished
to both foreign and domestic vessels. It takes cognizance of
pilotage, wharfage, towage, negligence in towing, seamen's
wages and, in fact, all matters properly referable to marine commerce.
Having considered the general subject of jurisdiction, let me
now call your attention to certain subjects which are within that
jurisdiction, and which may be considered under the general
head ofMARITIME LIENS.
A ship is made to plough the sea, and not to rot at the wharf.
It is necessary, therefore, that she have a crew and should be
furnished with all proper supplies to make her seaworthy at the
start, and to keep her in that condition during the voyage. In
ancient time, and up to the application of steam as a motive
power, voyages were protracted, sometimes lasting for years.
Anciently the cargo was owned by the owner of the ship, and was
carried to distant ports to be traded off for the products of the
countries visited, which were brought back to the ports from
which the vessel had sailed. It was seldom that the owner accompanied the ship. The duty of disposing of the cargo and of trading for the return cargo was generally deputed by the owner,
either to the master, or to some other representative called a
super cargo. The master, however, had supreme control of the
navigation of the ship and of obtaining the necessary supplies
at any port which he might enter while upon the voyage. The
law, therefore, granted him great powers with respect to the
ship, commensurate with the exigencies of the occasion. It was
necessary for the safety of the crew and of the vessel that he
have supreme power, and the crew were bound to obey his
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orders without question or demur; the master, however, being
answerable for any abuse of that power. It often occurred that
the ship in a foreign port needed supplies to continue her voyage,
or repairs to make her seaworthy, and the law invested the master
of the ship with power to obtain those supplies and repairs, and
for that purpose to borrow money in a foreign port on the security of the vessel. Those repairs and supplies constituted a
maritime lien upon the ship. This maritime lien is a claim-or
privilege on the thing-on the vessel- although the possession
of the vessel was not delivered to the person advancing the money
for the supplies or repairs. It was a proprietary right in the
thing itself, called in the maritime law a jus in re-that is, a
right to follow the vessel wherever she may be and enforce the
claim through the courts of admiralty. So, also, he could obtain
money on bottomry bonds, that is, a sum of money as a loan for
a particular voyage, at a very high rate of interest, called maritime interest, on the security of the ship, freight and cargo, upon
the condition that if the voyage be performed safely, the money
with interest shall be repaid; but if the vessel be lost by peril of
the sea, then nothing was payable. Respondentia bonds could also
be given for loans made on the cargo instead of the ship. In
other words, with respect to supplies, repairs and money necessary to be obtained for the ship and used for the purpose of the
voyage, the master was the alter ego of the owner and could
bind the ship. He was also vested with large discretion with
respect to the navigation of the vessel, and with power over the
cargo in respect of that navigation. In case of storm or stress
of weather when it became necessary to lighten the ship, the
master could direct a particular part of the cargo to be sacrificed by being thrown overboard to lighten the vessel. This is
called a "jactus". The loss thereby sustained is borne by the
remainder of the cargo and by the ship, and by the amount of
freight money earned, in what is called general average, or
average contribution; each thing saved by the jactus paying in
proportion to its value for that which had been sacrificed for
the common good. So that, if cargo or ship should take fire, and
in the extinguishment of the conflagration the cargo or a part of
it should be damaged by water, that which was lost must be compensated for by that which was saved in general average contribution. Three things must concur to authorize that contribution. First, a common imminent peril. Second, a voluntary sacri121
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fice. Third, successful avoidance of the danger. But, as the discretion of thus destroying a part for the general good is lodged
with the master, his mind must determine the necessity, and order
the sacrifice. So it has been held by the Supreme Court that
where a conflagration in the hold of a vessel was extinguished
by the fire department of a city without any direction of the
master, and to prevent the spread of the conflagration, there could
be no general average contribution; but otherwise if the destruction by the fire department was by the direction of the master.
SEAMEN'S WAGES.
Anciently seamen were not entitled to wages unless freight
was earned. It would seem to have been a sort of partnership,
all parties being interested in the common adventure, dividing the
profits ratably if the adventure was successful, and the seamen
not receiving wages in case of disaster. Hence the maxim that
"Freight is the mother of wages." 'And it was not until about
the year 1825 that by the act of Congress seamen were entitled
in any event to the wages contracted for. Seamen have been the
peculiar care of the courts of admiralty- wards of the courtwhich has at all times been careful to see that they were not
imposed upon, and to grant them speedy relief, without the delay
and expense attending ordinary suitors in its courts. They have
been considered an improvident and reckless class of men, childlike in respect of business, and needing protection. Whether that
view should prevail at the present day may be doubted, for they
seem to have adopted the customs of other laborers and have
formed unions for their own protection, and they have learned
to strike. Seamen's wages have been considered the first lien
upon a vessel and are payable out of the proceeds of sale of the
vessel; because the services of the seamen were necessary to the
navigation of the ship, to the earning of freight, and to bring her
safely into port. There are, however, one or two exceptions to
this, notably in the case of collision between two vessels, where
the damages done to a vessel are first payable out of the proceeds of the sale of the vessel in default, in priority to the claims
of seamen for wages earned prior to the collision; because the
vessel and crew doing the damage are treated as the offending
thing and as all being guilty of the wrong. But it is otherwise
as to wages earned subsequent to collision in bringing the defaulting vessel into port, because without their services the de-
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faulting vessel could not have been subjected to the payment of
the damage inflicted.
SAL VAGE.
As a vessel is subject to storm and wind and likely to be put
at the mercy of the waves, or driven ashore at a distance from
any port and can only be saved by a passing vessel or by those
on shore giving voluntary assistance, the courts have liberally
decreed compensation to salvors for the service rendered. This
right is unknown to the common-law or to chancery. It is a
moral claim, a duty of imperfect obligation. It is of the same class
as the voluntary saving of a house on fire upon the land; but no
right to compensation therefor is recognized at the common-law.
It is like the case on land of houses blown up by dynamite to
stay the spread of a conflagration; and yet by the common-law
no remedy is given the owner. I have mentioned to you the case
of a jactus, the throwing overboard of part of the cargo to lighten
the ship and save the balance, where the admiralty charges that
saved with the value of that sacrificed. You will thus see the
broader equity that exists in the admiralty which allows such
claims and will not permit the innocent to suffer, but charges
his loss upon that saved by the sacrifice of his property.
Salvage depends upon no contract, although it may be contracted for, and then compensation is governed by the terms of
the contract. Salvage is a reward allowed for a service rendered
to marine property at risk or in distress by one under no legal
obligation to do so, and resulting in benefit to the property if
eventually saved. The considerations of humanity in relief of
distress, or the preservation of life, or the risk incurred, do not
affect the right to compensation; they are only considered with
respect to the amount of compensation. This compensation is for
the service which a volunteer adventurer spontaneously renders
to the owner in the recovery of property from loss or damage at
sea, under the responsibility of returning the property to the
owner if saved and with a lien upon the property saved as their
reward. This compensation is very liberally extended, and should
be so from the necessities of the situation as an encouragement
to other vessels or to men upon the shore to aid vessels in distress. It includesist: The towage of disabled vessels. 2nd: Piloting or navigating endangered ships. 3rd: Removing persons or cargoes
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from vessels in distress. 4th: Saving a stranded ship. 5th: Raising a sunken ship or cargo. 6th: Saving a derelict or wreck.
7th: Taking aid to a distressed ship. 8th: Saving persons in the
boats of a distressed ship. 9th: Protecting ship or cargo or passengers from pirates. ioth: Furnishing men or necessary supplies to a ship at sea and short of them. iith: Saving ship and
cargo from fire either on board or in dangerous proximity.
12th: Or from any impending danger; as for example, an ice-floe.
It is not essential that the danger be immediate and absolute. It
is sufficient if the vessel has encountered danger which might
expose her to destruction if the service be not rendered.
The service must be voluntary, that is, must be rendered by
one under no legal obligation to render it. Therefore the crew
cannot claim salvage, because it is their legal duty to stand by
the ship in all danger. Nor can the pilot, nor can a life-saving
crew, for they act only in discharge of their duty.
Success is essential to maintaining a claim for salvage. The
ship or cargo must be saved and returned to the owner. Thus,
if a salvor find a ship three thousand miles away from her port
and loses her at the harbor bar, no remuneration can be allowed,
for no benefit is conferred upon the owner.
Reward for salvage is always liberal and made with reference
to the value of that saved. It is not only allowed for the time
and labor expended, but as a bounty in addition, to encourage
efforts to relieve distress at sea. The amount to be allowed rests
in the sound discretion of the court.
The elements to be considered in determining the amount of
the award areist: The degree of danger from which the ship has been
rescued. 2nd: The value of the property saved. 3rd: The value
of the salvor's property put at risk in the saving. 4th: The risk
incurred by the salvor. 5th: The skill shown. 6th: The time
and labor expended. 7th: The degree of success obtained. And
the amount allowed is always liberal.
The reward is distributed by the court among all engaged in
the service of saving, the owner of the ship engaged in saving,
the crew and the master. If the saving vessel be a steamer, her
owners are usually allowed three-fourths of the amount awarded,
because of the danger to the property employed and the risk incurred. The balance is distributed among the master and crew,
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the master receiving the larger proportion by reason of the responsibility assumed by him. The portion for the crew is divided
among them in proportion to their wages. The salvage service is
chargeable to the ship and cargo saved in proportion to their
values. The freight money earned must also contribute.
MARINE TORTS.
A marine tort must be consummate upon the water and to a
navigable thing; but the primal cause may arise upon the land.
Thus collision between two vessels is a marine tort cognizable in
the admiralty. But an injury to a bridge over the water by a
vessel upon the water is not within the definition of a marine
tort, although an injury to a vessel by a bridge would be. So
sparks from a steamer setting fire to property on land is not a
marine tort; but otherwise if a ship is set fire to by a cause
arising upon the land.
I am free to confess that I am not persuaded of the logic of
this distinction. It seems to me a survival of the old English
doctrine which was adverse to any jurisdiction by the admiralty.
However, that has been settled by the Supreme Court, and in a
recent case the Judges have declined to recede from their former
holding on that subject.
COLLISIONS AT SEA
Collisions at sea are not infrequent and they have sought to
be avoided by the establishment of certain laws of the road, so
to speak, by which one vessel can the more readily avoid collision
with another. A vessel is required to provide proper lookouts at
all times, to watch for vessels in its course. They are also required
to provide certain lights, one on the starboard and one upon the
port bow, of different colors, which shall warn other vessels not
only of the existence of the approaching vessel, but of its course.
There are distinctive lights provided for different kinds of vessels,
and this whether the vessel is under way or at anchor. They are
required to sound signals in cases of fog and, in case of steamers,
to reduce their speed - although the captains of ocean steamers
insist that there is much less danger of collision if their speed is
kept up or increased, that they may get out of the bank of fog
sooner.
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There are also rules regulating steamers and sailing vessels.
A steamer must keep out of the way of a sailing vessel and give
her wide berth, because she is more easily handled. And when
a steamer and sailing vessel are approaching each other, the sailing vessel must keep on her course and not change it, except in
case of imminent danger. The steamer is bound to keep out of
her way. In case of collision there is a peculiar provision in the
admiralty which appeals to the equity. If both vessels are in
fault, the damages of both are added together and divided and
each vessel must sustain the one-half of the damage. This, of
course, is necessarily arbitrary, but is much more equitable than
the common-law rule. There, if one be grossly negligent and has
caused damage and the other party has been slightly negligent,
but that slight negligence has contributed to the injury, there can
be no recovery, and the grossly negligent party escapes altogether.
Whereas, by the admiralty rule, both parties at fault are punished
for the negligence. Each must bear his proper proportion.
DEMURRAGE.
A ship is entitled to dispatch. She cannot be tied up at the
wharf. She is made to plough the seas. So the consignee of a
cargo must unload within reasonable time and with the usual
dispatch of the port. But there is no liability for demurrage if
the delay arises from some unforeseen cause over which the consignee has no control or if it be caused by authority of law. Provisions with respect to demurrage and liability therefore are
usually stipulated in the bill of lading.
LIABILITY FOR INJURY TO PASSENGERS BY
NEGLIGENCE.
The owners of a vessel are answerable for such injury; but
no action in rem against the vessel will lie. And this upon the
ground that the vessel is only liable for that which is in aid of
her preservation. If the injury be occasioned by the negligence
of another vessel, the owners of the offending ship are liable. If
the negligence of both colliding vessels contribute to the injury,
the owners of both are liable. The statutes of most of the states
now give damages to the representatives for the death of a passenger. While there is no such original provision in the admiralty,
yet the admiralty will enforce that statute in personam against the
owner of the vessel.
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LIMITED LIABILITY ACT.
Anciently the owners of vessels were bound in solido for the
liabilities of the ship arising from contract, and in proportion to
their interest for liabilities arising out of tort. There was no
limit of liability as respects the value of the vessel. The burden
of this responsibility, the frequency of marine disasters in the
days of frail crafts, the need of encouraging marine adventurethat being the only mode of communication between nationsled to the adoption in the maritime codes of provision limiting
the liability of owners to their respective interests and by the
value of the ship and freight. The noted ordinance of Louis XIV
made the owners liable for the acts of the master and providing
that they should be discharged of liability, abandoning to creditors
and claimants their ship and its freight.
The first act in the United States upon this subject was passed
March 3, 1851, and the object was stated by Mr. Justice Bradley
in Norwich vs. Wright, 13 Wall, lO4.
The great object of the law was to encourage ship-building
and to induce capitalists to invest money in this branch of industry. Unless they can be induced to do so, the shipping interests
of the country must flag and decline. Those who are willing to
manage and work ships are generally unable to build and fit
them. They have plenty of hardness and personal daring and enterprise, but they have little capital. On the other hand, those
who have capital and invest it in ships, incur a great haza'd in
exposing their property to the perils of the sea and to the management of sea-faring men without making them liable for additional losses and damage to an indefinite amount. How many
enterprises in mining, manufacturing and internal improvements
would be utterly impracticable if capitalists were not encouraged
to invest in them through corporate institutions by which they
are exempt from personal liability except to a limited extent. The
public interests require the investment of capital in ship-building
quite as much as in any of these enterprises; and if there exist
good reason for exempting innocent shipowners from liability,
beyond the amount of their interest for loss or damage to goods
carried in their vessels, precisely the same reasons exist for exempting them to the same extent from personal liability in cases
of collision. In the one case as in the other, their property is in
the hands of agents whom they are obliged to employ. The act
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exempts the one upon surrender of the vessel from liability arising from casualty by fire, embezzlement, loss or destruction of
goods by master or crew, damage from collision, and from any
loss occurring without the privity or knowledge of the owner.
The proceeding by which that law is inforced is one in ren
against the vessel and pending freight. A petition is filed in admiralty by the owner and all claimants are summoned in as parties. The vessel, or what is left of the vessel, is then appraised. It
is then either sold and proceeds covered into the treasury of the
court, or the owner may give bond in the penalty of the appraised value and have the vessel returned. Then in that proceeding the owner may contest any claim, either as to its validity
or amount, and the proceeds of the sale of the vessel are divided
pro rata among adjudicated claims. The proceeding is unique,
somewhat like bankruptcy proceeding, marshaling and distributing assets. This proceeding also renders abortive any action at
common-law to render the owner liable.
In respect to proceedings in admiralty there are two classes,
as I have stated, proceedings in rem and proceedings in personam.
The first is a proceeding directly against the vessel and its cargo
and not against the individual owners. The vessel is deemed always the offending thing and the libel is filed against it. This
libel corresponds to the declaration or complaint at common law.
Admiralty, however, is unlike the common-law and more nearly
resembles the jurisdiction of a court of equity. The libel consists
in a series of articles, so called, in which the jurisdiction of the
court is stated, the character of the vessel, the cause of the complaint against the vessel. Upon filing the libel a writ issues out
of the court to the marshal to seize the vessel if within the jurisdiction of the court, and to notify all parties interested by publication, to appear at the time and place stated and defend their
interest in the vessel. The owners of the vessel within the time
stated can obtain a discharge of the vessel from the custody of
the marshal upon filing a bond to respond to any judgment which
may be rendered. Otherwise the vessel is presently sold under
the direction of the court, because she is a perishable thing and
cannot be allowed to rot at the wharf. In case of sale the proceeds are paid into court to abide the judgment and order of the
court in the proceeding. If the vessel be bonded, the case proceeds as if the vessel were there, and when the decree is rendered.
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if one be rendered to the libelant, it goes against the owner of the
vessel and his bondsman for the amount of damages awarded.
The answer to the libel must be full and specific to each article
of the libel. It must not only deny the charges of the libel which
are claimed to be erroneous, but in case of damage by collision a
general plea of not guilty or a general denial as at common law
will not avail. The answer must go further, following more
nearly the answer in equity and state the vessel's version of the
collision and its cause, so that the court may have both sides of
the story stated in the pleading, and determine whether the facts
proven sustain the one side or the other. If he deem the answer
insufficient, the libelant (who answers to the plaintiff in a common-law suit) may file his exceptions to it and the court then
determines the question.
The testimony is usually taken out of court by deposition or
before a commissioner; but, of course, it may be taken in open
court, and a decree is entered as the court may determine the
right to be. This decree may be appealed to the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the circuit within six months from
the entry of the decree. There is this difference to be noted between appeals in the admiralty and appeals in other cases either
at common-law or in equity- the trial of an appeal in admiralty
is a new trial of the whole suit. The decree is opened by the
appeal and the Court of Appeals may enter its decree in the appellate court, or refer it back to the trial court, directing the sort
of decree to be entered. Upon the appeal the appellate court may
take new testimony if it sees proper to do so, but of course this
will not be allowed unless the parties have shown due diligence
with respect to obtaining it for use before the trial court.

